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Broom or Jail: All Progressive Congress (APC) and the Anti-Corruption Campaign, 2015-2024

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Abstract

Over two decades since the return to civil rule in 1999, the Nigerian state has continued to struggle to reduce, if not completely, eradicated the growing incidences of corruption but to no avail. Its persistence has negatively impacted on economic growth and tends to undermine public trust. The All Progressive Congress (APC) came to power in 2015 on the mantra that its presidential flag bearer was incorruptible hence his readiness to stamp corruption out of Nigeria. However, selectivity in the fight against corruption tends to have dampened every iota of hope that APC can end corruption in Nigeria. The study adopted a mixed-methods approach consisting of in-depth interviews and surveys questionnaire to provide a comprehensive analysis of the APC's anticorruption efforts. Data was collected from 12 states and the FCT using purposive method. In-depth interviews were conducted with 26 participants, including politicians and civil society organization members, while a survey of 260 respondents were used to gather quantitative data. Data was analyzed using SPSS and STATA, with descriptive statistics addressing the research questions. Finding shows 61.92% full acceptance that the APC government's anticorruption drive lacked transparency and 54.31% of the respondents agreed that the crusade was selective. This study therefore concluded that the APC's anticorruption campaign has failed to address systemic corruption as a result of selective execution of anti-corruption war that mainly seeks to witch-hunt political opponents. The corruption crusade retarded economic growth and has continuously presented a bad image about the country. The paper recommended transparency in the anticorruption fight, establishing due process units in government and strengthening the legal and institutional framework of anticorruption to ensure positive outcomes in the anti-corruption war.

Keyword: All Progressive Congress; Anti-corruption; Broom or jail, Nigeria

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Résumé

Depuis le retour à un régime civil en 1999, il y a plus de vingt ans, l'État nigérian peine à réduire, voire à éradiquer, la corruption croissante, sans y parvenir. Sa persistance freine la croissance économique et érode la confiance du public. Le Congrès des progressistes (APC) est arrivé au pouvoir en 2015 en proclamant l'intégrité de son candidat à la présidence et sa volonté d'éradiquer la corruption du Nigeria. Cependant, la sélectivité de la lutte contre la corruption a anéanti tout espoir de voir l'APC y parvenir. Cette étude, combinant entretiens approfondis et questionnaires, analyse en profondeur les efforts anticorruption de l'APC. Les données ont été collectées dans 12 États et le Territoire de la capitale fédérale (FCT) selon une méthode raisonnée. Des entretiens approfondis ont été menés auprès de 26 participants, dont des personnalités politiques et des membres d'organisations de la société civile, tandis qu'un questionnaire auprès de 260 répondants a permis de recueillir des données quantitatives. Les données ont été analysées à l'aide des logiciels SPSS et STATA, et des statistiques descriptives ont permis de répondre aux questions de recherche. Les résultats montrent que 61,92 % des personnes interrogées estiment que la campagne anticorruption du gouvernement de l'APC manque de transparence, et que 54,31 % d'entre elles la jugent sélective. Cette étude conclut donc que la campagne anticorruption de l'APC n'a pas permis de lutter contre la corruption systémique, en raison d'une application sélective de cette politique, qui vise principalement à persécuter les opposants politiques. Cette campagne a freiné la croissance économique et a durablement terni l'image du pays. L'étude recommande la transparence dans la lutte anticorruption, la mise en place de cellules de contrôle des procédures au sein du gouvernement et le renforcement du cadre juridique et institutionnel de la lutte anticorruption afin d'assurer des résultats positifs.

Mots-clés: Congrès progressiste ; Lutte contre ; la corruption ; Nigéria

Introduction

A broom is a cleaning tool used for sweeping floors. It is a versatile tool for maintaining hygiene and order. It can be used to sweep away dust, debris, and dirty floor. Beyond cleaning, they are used for removing cobwebs from high corners. Symbolically, the Broom clears negativity, fosters protection, and in many traditions, fertility and new beginning. In Yoruba tradition, the Broom is a tool for divination and a symbol of power. The adoption of broom as a symbol by the ruling political party (APC) in Nigeria, witnessed acceptable ceremony. It was launched as a change symbol, indicating the readiness to sweep out the government of the People democratic Party (PDP), which was labelled as corrupt and unperforming. It was metaphorically referred to by the Media as the *Broom Revolution*, meant to sweep away corruption from Nigeria. However, fourteen (14) after coming to power in Nigeria, the broom seems not to be sweeping away corruption and corrupt people, but attracting them. Corrupt people who joined the Broom symbol are rewarded by appointment and juicy contract, those who refused to join are charged to court and sentenced to jail. It is no longer the Broom that promised purification and cleansing, but a Broom that attracts unwanted corrupt persons and politicians; thus, encouraging corruption in Nigeria.

Endemic corruption has remained one of the most significant challenges bedeviling Nigeria and has continually undermined its economic growth, exacerbated inequality, and shattered public trust in governance (Adebayo, 2019). Previous Nigerian administrations have struggled to make meaningful progress in combating corruption with policy decisions such as the establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission and Economic and

Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) during the regime of President Olusegun Obasanjo (Chukwu, 2019; Smith, 2020; Nnorom, 2022). In spite of the establishment of these institutions, corruption in Nigeria has deeply eaten into both the public and private sectors, contributing to normalization of culture of impunity and maladministration. The All Progressives Congress (APC), party which emerged in 2013 following the merger of several opposition parties, including the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), had promised to curb corruption to a tolerable level. It took over power in 2015 largely on the strength of its promise to eradicate endemic corruption in the country (Ogunyemi, 2020). On assumption of office as the APC first president of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari sought to present itself as the antithesis of previous military and PDP governments by positioning anticorruption as a defining feature of his political agenda and philosophy (Adebayo, 2020; Ogunyemi, 2020).

The APC's anti-corruption campaign was framed as one of the central pillars of the party's mandate, with former President Buhari consistently emphasizing his commitment to tackling the widespread corruption at all levels of government. This was symbolized by the party's iconic symbol "broom," which represented the intent to sweep off corruption from Nigeria's political and economic systems (Ogunyemi, 2020). Since the formation of the party, her anti-corruption narrative garnered significant public support, as many Nigerians viewed it as a necessary corrective to the deep-rooted corruption that had beleaguered the country for decades causing untold hardship for the citizens.

While the APC government promised a broad, impartial approach to tackling corruption as former President Buhari said in his assumption of office speech "I belong to no body, I belong to everybody", however, in practice, the campaign seems to have been characterized by what critics call a selective and politically motivated anti-corruption fight (Smith, 2020). This selective anticorruption argument persists despite the high-profile investigations, arrests, and prosecutions of public figures notably of People's Democratic Party (PDP). The beginning of APC's fight against corruption presented a picture of an aggressive anticorruption effort (Adebayo, 2020). Specifically, the government made concerted efforts and extensively utilized the EFCC to pursue corruption cases, with several former governors, ministers, and legislators being arrested and tried with significant amount of money and properties retrieved from them (Doe, 2021; Smith, 2021). However, a growing body of evidence suggests that the government's actions have been disproportionately focused on opposition figures, especially PDP members (Ibrahim & Hassan, 2023). This highlights the non-broad, non-systemic approach to tackling corruption employed by the ruling political party.

Interestingly, the critics of APC's anticorruption drive have always highlighted this purported selective nature and the potential for it to be used as a political tool for weakening opposition parties. Their argument stems from records of prosecution of opposition figures while exonerating its party members from scrutiny which to them casted doubt about the genuineness of the motivations behind the campaign (Ejiofor, 2024). This has led many to question whether the fight against corruption is truly about promoting good governance or simply about consolidating political power at the expense of political rivals (Okafor, 2021). The selective application of anticorruption policies has sparked debate about the credibility of the APC's efforts and whether the government is using the anticorruption agenda as a tool for political advantage by jailing their political opponent and declaring those that join their party as corruption free. For instance, former APC Chairman, Adams Oshomhole in 2019 while receiving PDP defectors to APC remarked "join APC, your sins are forgiven" (Ahanor, 2025).

Thus, the new government of Bola Tinubu appears to have re-strategized in their policy of "mandatory membership of APC or compulsory punishment". The government plants people

in opposition party to foment troubles, uses threat, intimidation and bullying of the opposition party members to compel them to join APC. Most recently is the defection of PDP members in Delta state, including the immediate past Vice-presidential candidate of PDP in the 2023 presidential election and the serving governor to the APC. It could be recalled that the immediate past Vice-presidential candidate of PDP in the 2023 presidential general election was recently placed under the EFCC investigation.

This study assesses APC's anti-corruption drive to determine whether the APC led government has genuinely addressed the systemic issues of corruption or whether it has primarily utilized it for consolidating political power. The study examined public perception of the fight against corruption and the methods used to ascertain whether it has yielded the desired result. The expectation in this study is that the findings will provide a nuanced understanding on whether the APC's anticorruption agenda has resulted in tangible improvements in governance or whether it has simply perpetuated the very issues it sought to address.

Methodology

This study adopted the mixed method research approach. According to Creswell & Plano Clark, (2017), the mixed method research approach is a method that combines both qualitative and quantitative research techniques to provide a more comprehensive understanding of a research problem. In this study, we employed documentary and survey methods in generating the data used to provide answers to the research questions that guided it. Specifically, the qualitative part, helped for a deeper understanding of individual perceptions and experiences of how the APC's government has been fighting corruption since they took over power in Nigeria in 2015. On the other hand, the quantitative method provided data for generalization and measurability of the corruption fight and government's capacity to address endemic corruption in the country. The administration of the questionnaire adopted the interviewer administered method. This was done to ensure that the research assistants explained, where necessary, the items in the questionnaire to the respondents. The choice of mixed methods enabled the study to triangulate findings from different data sources and provide a richer and more reliable analysis and findings (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017).

The 6 geo-political zones in the country were used as clusters for the study. The data for this study was collected from 12 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The selection of the states was purposively done; and respondents were drawn from states whose governors were in the ruling APC party and any of the opposing parties like PDP, All progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) and New Nigerian Peoples Party (NNPP). The Labour Party (LP) was not selected because it didn't produce any state government for years until the last general election in 2023 that it produced a governor. The APGA that has been in power for many years was selected instead of LP. For the qualitative data, in each of the 12 states and the FCT, 2 respondents were interviewed. The people interviewed comprised of 1 politicians and civil society organization (CSO) member in each location. In all, a total of 26 in-depth interviews were conducted and the responses transcribed for analysis. The coding for the interviewee followed the category and state where they reside. For instance, a Civil Society Organization member in Lagos was coded as (CSO, Lagos) while a politician in the same state was coded as (POL, Lagos). This was done for simplicity and it was necessary since only one respondent was gotten for these categories in each state.

The quantitative data collection was used to elicit information from a total of 260 respondents comprising of 20 respondents per state and FCT. The selection of the respondents was purposively done and the eligibility criteria was those that have lived in the country for at least 10 years to have witnessed the regime of PDP which ended in 2015, involved in political

events and have participated in voting prior to the data collection day. The study used 13 research assistants with each person collecting data from each of the states used in this study. The research assistants are majorly postgraduate students who have lived for at least 10 years in the states assigned to them. This was done to ensure their sufficient knowledge of the dynamics and peculiarity of the state assigned to them. The data generated was coded using SPSS and analyzed using STATA. Descriptive statistics was used to address the research questions raised in this study.

Theoretical Guide

The Principal-Agent theory propounded by Stephen Ross and Barry Mitnick (1973) and developed upon by Batley (2004) was adopted for this study. The basic tenet of the theory is that corruption arises when a principal (e.g., government/citizens) delegates power to an agent (e.g., official) who then misuses the authority for personal gain, usually because of a lack of oversight. The theory assumes that actors are motivated by rational self interest. The relevance of the theory to this study is on how the agents (government officials, politicians, legislators, bureaucrats etc) used the opportunity to privatise the wealth of the citizens to themselves.

In a democracy, the citizens are seen as the principal. Those in government are elected by the citizens to serve them by providing services. The citizens are therefore, the ultimate consumers of the services provided by the government. In the context of the principal-agent theory, the principal must check against the agents' activities and curb excesses that are negatively affecting expected development of the principal. There is problem when the agents who are supposed to provide services would tend to use the opportunity of being in power to divert benefits to themselves and their cronies. The setting up institutions (ICPC and EFCC) to checkmate against corruption is not enough, more so, when the institutions are not truly independent and strong enough to operate on their own. The principal (citizens) should begin to checkmate and curb the excesses of the agents (government) of corruption must stop to create room for honest and effective development.

Results

Respondents' information

The result for the age distribution of the sampled respondents depicts a gender imbalance with 86.15% male and 13.85% female (see fig. 1). As high as 74.23% of the respondents were currently married while 21.54% and 4.23% were currently single and widowed respectively (see fig. 2). In terms of educational qualification, 29.23% had acquired secondary education, while 27.31% and 20.0% had some post-secondary education and post-secondary education respectively (see fig. 3). On the political party affiliation of the respondents, the distribution centered around PDP (36.54%), APC (26.92%) and LP (26.15%) with the remaining ones belonging to NNPP and APGA (see fig. 4). The occupation of the respondents shows that 43.46% were employed in the private sector while 34.23% and 22.31% were self-employed and employed in the public sector respectively (see fig. 5).

Twenty (20) respondents were gotten from each study location. This represented approximately 7.69% for each location (see fig. 6). For the religious affiliation of the respondents, more than a half (52.31%) were Christians while 42.31 were Muslims (see fig. 7). The minimum age of the respondents was 29 years while the maximum age was 66 years with a mean of 48.01 years. Further distribution shows that more than 80% of the respondents were aged 41 years and above confirming the mean age (see fig. 8). For the number of years, they

have been involved in election, the minimum years was 2 years while the maximum was 39 years; a mean of 11.72 years. The distribution in group shows that majority of them have been involved in election for not more than 20 years which confirms the mean years of 11.72 years (see fig.9). On the number of years of membership of a political party, the minimum was 1 year while the maximum was 32 years; with a mean of 7.07 years (see table 1). This aligns with the grouped years of experience as a political party member which shows that more than 70% of the respondents have been in politics for not more than 10 years (see fig.10).

For information on those interviewed, 50% of were politicians while the remaining 50% were from civil society organizations. As many as 80.8% of those in the in-depth interview were male and 84.6% married. Fifty percent (50%) of them have some post-secondary education while 26.9% and 19.2% have secondary education and post-secondary education as their highest completed formal education. The dominant age bracket was 41 to 50 years which recorded 57.7% while 31 to 40 years and above 50 years recorded 7.7% and 34.6% respectively (see table 2).

Perception of Nigerians on APC government anti-corruption drive

Generally, we administered data to determine the perception of Nigerians on APC anti-corruption drive. The results indicate that 61.92% of the respondents believed that the APC's government corruption fight in Nigeria has not been transparent, while 25.77% believes that it has been to some extent and 12.31% believes completely that it has been transparent. On the fight against corruption, 61.54% of the respondents did not believe that the government has been sincere in the fight against corruption in the country; only 2.31% believed they were sincere. On the method used to tackle corruption by the APC led government in Nigeria, most of the respondents (54.31%) believed it has been selective; while 21.54% believed it has not been selective (see table 3).

The quantitative results are further buttressed with quotes from the transcript of the qualitative data by two of the Chief Security Officers (CSO) of Kogi and Rivers States. For instance, the Kogi state CSO succinctly argued that APC anti-corruption drive cannot be transparent and sincere especially when cognizance is taken of the case of the immediate past governor of Kogi state, who is still hosting parties and dancing in the town; and his benefactors praising and calling him lion that cannot be tamed in spite of corruption charges against him. According to him, the entire fight by the APC government is to fight perceived political enemies; hence it amounts to selective anti-corruption crusade. Also, the CSO, Rivers state, insisted that there is absolutely no transparency in the fight against corruption by the APC government. He observed that though the government tends to pursue anti-corruption policy as a strategy to clean the rot in public spaces, it ends up making the existing corruption incidences more complex.

As far as corruption is concerned, majority of the respondents (52.69%) believed that the *Broom revolution* of the APC governments has failed in the fight against corruption. However, another 20.77% believed it is effective, while another 26.54% argued that it has to some extent been effective. For the effectiveness of the method in improving the way Nigeria and Nigerians are seen globally, 59.52% believed it has not achieved any meaningful impact while 39.23% and 1.15% believed in the contrary. Majority of the respondents (51.92%) believed the method used by the APC in the anti-corruption drive has not yielded impressive result. This is compared to 29.62% who believed it yielded some effective results, while 18.46% applauded the effect of the corruption crusade completely (see table 4). The interview outcome seems to confirm the quantitative findings. As one of the respondents noted, the fight against corruption has not been effective and will not be effective because of the way it is been

done. Almost all the people being tried for corruption are not APC members and even the party's former chairman (Comrade Adam Aliyu Oshiomhole) said that joining the party means one's corrupt dealings will be ignored. "Just imagine such callous talk on a national television". So, the style can't produce meaningful result because, if I am threatened of corrupt charges, I will join the ruling party and everything becomes new (A respondent from Anambra State).

No doubts, the ineffectiveness of government anti-corruption drive is not unconnected with the fact that government is not sincere with the entire process. In fact, 65.38% of the respondents accepted that government is not sincere and another 16.62 agreed to some extent that the government is encourage corruption among its workforce. According to CSO (Rivers state), the entire charade called anti-corruption fight by the ruling party even during the regime of the former President Buhari had remained one sided Furthermore, 51.92% of the respondents believed that the government itself is corrupt with another 24.62% believing same to some extent thereby implying that a corrupt government can't fight corruption in the country.

Incidentally, another reason for the ineffectiveness of the current regimes' anti-corruption drive is because it was used on majorly the perceived political enemies of the party. This perception is attributed to 65.38% of the respondents, while 20.38% agreed to some extent, thus confirming the earlier findings that the fight has not been sincere. Also, the result shows that 57.31% of the respondents agreed completely that opponents' of the ruling APC party who later joined the APC had their earlier corruption charges dropped on joining the party with another 28.85% agreeing to it to some extent.

There is also a near complete agreement on whether strong structure to fight corruption is lacking in the country which makes the anti-corruption drive ineffective. In this regard, 75.77% and 11.15% of the respondents "agreed completely" and "to some extent" respectively on the assertion "there is no structure to fight corruption in the country. The appointment of key anti-corruption officers by the ruling party was seen as another reason for lack of effectiveness of the drive. About 74.62% and 12.31% of the respondents agreed (completely and to some extent, respectively) that the government appointment of key officeholders to head the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Offences Commission, (ICPC), and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) make the anticorruption fight ineffective. The executive arm was seen to be unnecessarily too powerful and made the anticorruption drive ineffective. As many as 54.62% and 32.31% of the respondents agreed completely and to some extent, respectively, that these practices appear to hinder effective anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria. There is also the belief that enough checks and balances which could have made the anti-corruption drive ineffective were lacking. As can be seen, 58.46% of the respondents believed that the checks were not there while 37.31% believed that to some extent the checks were there (see table 5). Indeed, the truth about all these is that Nigeria don't have a strong institution with enabling stature to tackle corruption. As it is currently structured, the executive arm is the one that appoint the heads of the agencies, and the one who approve who should be investigated and who should not be investigated. It turns out to be a case of "who pays the piper calls the tune". So long as this practices continues, nothing positive will be achieved as long as the executive is corrupt.

Discussion

Our results show that the APC government's anticorruption drive has not been transparent but selective. This aligns with existing findings on public perceptions of anticorruption efforts in Nigeria. Interestingly, several studies have highlighted the challenges of implementing effective anticorruption measures in Nigeria and have pointed to the pervasive influence of political patronage and selective enforcement. For instance, research by Olowu

(2018) emphasized that anticorruption campaigns often fail to transcend political interests, becoming tools for settling political scores rather than addressing systemic corruption. This underscores especially with the quantitative findings where most of the respondents perceive the APC's fight against corruption as selective. Another study by Adegboyega and Nwogwugwu (2017) also corroborates the submission as they argued that Nigerian governments frequently struggle with transparency in anticorruption measures, with citizens expressing distrust in the sincerity of governmental efforts. The survey's finding that most of respondents feel the anticorruption drive has not been transparent further confirms these concerns.

The qualitative data also mirrored the submissions of other studies, such as Shastri (2016), who argued that corruption campaigns in Nigeria often target political opponents while leaving allies or party members unscathed. The idea of a politically motivated anticorruption drive has also been noted by researcher like Okoye (2020), who submitted that anticorruption efforts in Nigeria often deepen partisan divides, as those in power use them to delegitimize rivals. Consequently, our findings corroborate strongly with the broader literature on the limitations of anticorruption strategies in Nigeria by underscoring the concerns about their political motivations, selective nature and lack of genuine transparency. The findings here further validate existing submissions, such as Smith (2020) and Ibrahim and Hassan (2023), who argued that the APC's anticorruption drive has been politically motivated, using corruption charges to weaken rivals rather than to genuinely address systemic corruption.

Results for the effectiveness of the APC government's anti-corruption drive highlight a clear gap between government actions and public perception. Majority of respondents felt that the anticorruption campaign had not been effective. While only a handful believed it has achieved its goals. This is in line with existing studies such as Olowu (2018) who argued that anticorruption efforts in Nigeria are often compromised by political patronage and selective enforcement where the ruling party uses these campaigns to target political opponents. Our finding also showed that the anticorruption campaign of APC has not improved Nigeria's global reputation which further underscores the concerns raised by Adegboyega and Nwogwugwu (2017) that such campaigns often lack transparency, fostering public distrust. The limited improvement in global perceptions validates the country's persistent low rankings on indices such as the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2020), which continues to show Nigeria as one of the most corrupt nations despite the claims of progress by the government. The findings of this study are in conformity with submission of Ibrahim and Hassan (2023), who argued that the APC's campaign has not produced tangible outcomes in terms of governance reform.

Our findings show that the ineffectiveness of the APC government's anticorruption drive was largely attributed to the lack of sincerity, political motivations, and institutional weaknesses. Most of the respondents believe the government has not been sincere in its efforts, with qualitative data echoing this sentiment and it centered particularly around claims of selective justice, where only non-APC members prosecuted. This finding corroborates the submission of Olowu (2018) that anticorruption campaigns often become politically charged, targeting opposition figures while sparing party allies. Apart from this, there is also the belief that the government itself is corrupt, further undermining the credibility of its anti-corruption stance, a point supported by Adegboyega and Nwogwugwu (2017), who emphasized that when the government is perceived as corrupt, its efforts to combat corruption lack legitimacy.

Furthermore, the qualitative data reveals widespread concern about the political manipulation of corruption charges, with many respondents suggesting that charges are often dropped for party members, which validates the argument of Shastri's (2016) that the

anticorruption fight is selective. The findings also point to structural issues, with majority of the respondents agreeing that there is no adequate framework to fight corruption, and concerns that key anti-corruption offices, like the EFCC, are politicized and controlled by the executive. The findings on the structural weaknesses validate the submissions of Okoye (2020) that the concentration of power in the executive branch and the lack of checks and balances make anticorruption efforts ineffective. The respondents believe that the current regime's anticorruption drive is more of a political witch-hunt than a genuine attempt to tackle systemic corruption reflects a broader skepticism, highlighting the deep-seated challenges to achieving meaningful anticorruption reform in Nigeria.

Conclusion

Corruption in any nation retards growth and development. It causes causes untold hardship for the citizens of the nation with corresponding increase in crime rate. Nigeria has over the years received its fair share of this vicious circle of resultant effect of corruption in government from the military regime to the present day. The findings in this study indicate that the APC government's anticorruption drive has not been sincere or effective. Empirical evidence from this study has shown that the campaign against corruption is ineffective and lacked transparency with many perceiving it as politically motivated. There was a widespread belief that the anticorruption efforts were selectively enforced, often targeting political opponents while protecting party allies. In addition, the perception that the government itself is corrupt and that there are inadequate structural frameworks for tackling corruption further undermine the legitimacy of the anticorruption campaign. Overall, the study underscores that the current anticorruption drive is purely a tool for political maneuvering rather than a genuine effort to address systemic corruption in Nigeria. The current approach by the present APC led government in Nigeria to tackle the deep-rooted corruption that crippled development in the country has not yielded the desired result. The adopted theory for this study indicates that the citizens (as principal) should begin to challenge agency abuse as shown by elected government officials elected and / or appointed to serve them. Beyond such import from the theory; and based on the findings in the study, the following recommendations are made:

- **Ensure transparency in anticorruption efforts:** The government must adopt clear and transparent processes for investigating and prosecuting corrupt government officials. They should also make public every available information on the progress and outcomes of cases as it will help rebuild trust in the anticorruption drive of the government.
- **Establishing and empowering the due process unit in all ministries, departments and agencies of government:** There is an important need to return and empower the due process unit which was paramount in reducing the widespread corruption in governments' public procurement and contracting practices between 2003 to 2005.
- **Strengthen the legal and institutional framework:** The government should strengthen legal and institutional structures and ensure the existence of clear as well as effective channels for addressing corruption. This includes updating outdated laws and enhancing the capacity of agencies like the EFCC and ICPC to carry out their mandates.
- **Promote accountability within government:** The government must lead by example by ensuring that senior officials and politicians are held accountable for any corrupt practices they engage in. Establishing internal mechanisms for checking corruption within the government can help set a standard for others to follow.

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


Fig I: Appendix 1 sex of the respondents




Fig 2: Appendix 11 Marital status of the respondents




Fig 3: Appendix 111 highest completed education of the respondents




Fig 4: Appendix 1V Political party affiliation of the respondents




Fig 5: Appendix V Occupation of the respondents




Fig: 6: Appendix V1 State of residence of the respondents




Fig 7: Appendix VI I religious affiliation of the respondents




Fig 8: Appendix VI II Age group of the respondents




Fig 9: Appendix VX



Fig 10: Appendix X

Table 1: Summary statistics for the quantitative information of the respondents

Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Age of survey respondent	260	48.01	8/72	29	66
Years involved in election	260	11.72	6.29	2	39
Years as a member of political party	260	7.07	5.12	1	32

Table 2: Summary Descriptive Statistics for the interviewed respondents

Response options	Frequencies	Percentages
Category of interviewee		
Politics	13	50.0
Civil Society Organization	13	50.0
Sex of interviewee		
Currently single	4	15.4
Currently married	22	84.6
Highest completed education of the interviewee		
Some secondary education	1	3.8
Secondary education	7	26.9
Some post-secondary education	13	50.0
Post-secondary education	5	19.2
Age group as at last birthday of interviewee		
31 to 40 years	2	7.7
41 to 50 years	15	57.7
Above 50 years	9	34.6

Table 3: Perception of respondents on the APC corruption fight in Nigeria

Response options	Frequencies	Percentages
The government corruption fight in Nigeria has been transparent		
Not at all	161	61.92
Yes, to some extent	67	25.77
Yes	32	12.31
The government have been sincere in tackling corruption in the country		
Not at all	160	61.54
Yes, to some extent	94	36.15
Yes	6	2.31
The fight has not been selective		
Not at all	136	52.31
Yes, to some extent	68	26.15
Yes	56	21.54
The corruption fight uses a top-down mechanism such that no one is exempted in the fight		
Not at all	143	55.0
Yes, to some extent	107	41.15
Yes	10	3.85

Table 4: Perception of respondents on the APC corruption fight in Nigeria effectiveness

Response options	Frequencies	Percentages
The fight has been effective		
Not at all	137	52.69
Yes, to some extent	69	26.54
Yes	54	20.77
The fight has improved the way Nigerians are seen		
Not at all	155	59.52
Yes, to some extent	102	39.23
Yes	3	1.15
The fight is yielding impressive result		
Not at all	135	51.92
Yes, to some extent	77	29.62
Yes	48	18.46

Table 5: Why APC governments fight against corruption in Nigeria has not been effectiveness

Response options	Frequencies	Percentages
Insincerity of the government		
Not at all	48	18.46
Yes, to some extent	42	16.62
Yes	170	65.38
The government is corrupt		
Not at all	61	23.46
Yes, to some extent	64	24.62

Yes	135	51.92
The fight is just for the enemies of the party		
Not at all	37	14.23
Yes, to some extent	53	20.38
Yes	170	65.28
People that join APC are forgiven and their corrupt charges dropped		
Not at all	36	13.85
Yes, to some extent	75	28.85
Yes	149	57.31
There is no structure to fight corruption in Nigeria		
Not at all	34	13.08
Yes, to some extent	29	11.15
Yes	197	75.77
Those in power appoints officeholders and they use them to do their bidding.		
Not at all	34	13.08
Yes, to some extent	32	12.31
Yes	194	74.62
The checks and balances expected in the government are functional		
Not at all	152	58.46
Yes, to some extent	97	37.31
Yes	11	4.23
Executive arm of government is unnecessarily not too powerful for checks and has caused corruption		
Not at all	34	13.08
Yes, to some extent	84	32.31
Yes	142	54.62