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## **Community Building as a Response to Insecurity; an Overview of Non- state Security Initiatives in Ibadan Residential Neighbourhoods**

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**ABSTRACT** - The paper presents an overview of the nature, types and modalities of the private security arrangements in Ibadan residential neighbourhoods. It examines the structure of sub local level governance and the implications on urban management. Using the Neighbourhood association as the platform for evaluation, the study used structured questionnaire, in-depth interview and participant observation methods to elicit information from the neighbourhood association executives. The questions asked include, the nature of activities engaged in and the security initiatives adopted by the resident, the methods used to secure participation and compliance in the neighbourhoods. Neighbourhood associations are becoming strong sub local administration with separate regulation and different forms of social cohesion. The nature of jurisdiction boundary demarcation is such that it excludes the unwanted and the objectors. The administrative boundaries are large at inception and later fragment into more homogenous groups. Different approaches were adopted for neighbourhood protection including patrol, road closure, vigilante and alarm systems. The paper concludes that socio-spatial partitioning of urban area reflects the way people want to be governed in a country like Nigeria that is still locking for ways of resolving logjam in socio-political re-grouping and democratic practice.

**Key words:** Community, response, security, residential, Ibadan

## **INTRODUCTION**

Community building as used in this paper derives from social organisation theory. Social organisation theory involved an integration of customs, teamwork, high morale, and bonding, which often lead to harmonious social relationships. Such a group showed solidarity, homogeneous and traditional behaviour. Urban neighbourhood culture develops through time and certain social and cultural behavioural patterns that are unique to a particular neighbourhood and based on prevailing experiences, administrative policies and legislative apparatus that are put in place in the sub-local urban setting. There are certain factors responsible for forging cohesion and social intercourse among residents of urban neighbourhoods which often determine their approaches to issues and models of relationships in the neighbourhood setting. Insecurity is one of those issues that often mould residents into a common strategic front to fight crime and incivility in the neighbourhoods (Onibokun 2003; Fabiyi2004).

Security concerns are major issues in most Sub Saharan African cities. The concern is fuelled by economic depression, incessant instability in government, wars, high level of inequality between the rich and the poor and the state failure to providing adequate security for her citizenry. This concern has continuously given rise to the emergence of private initiatives in the prevention and the control of crime and incivility. Urban residents regroup in manageable sizes to develop private initiatives to fight crime or to remove opportunities for criminal activities in their residential neighbourhoods. Historically, before the emergence of modern statehood, most Nigerian towns had high crime records in terms of invasions by the marauders and loot seekers. Cities and communities adopted strategies to prevent invasion of looters through trenches and walls. (Talbot 1924; Mabogunje 1968). The walls and trenches were protected by heavily armed warriors or watchmen while the gates were secured by gate keepers. The emergence of conventional statehood and the adoption of modern police system led to disappearance of the traditional police systems in most cities. However in the last three decades, there is a subtle re-emergence of neighbourhood based security networks and crime control strategies.

Urban spaces are in continuous process of fragmentations to suit the newly emerging sub local level urban administration. These types of neighbourhood regrouping and redefinition of boundaries are increasing in Nigerian cities bringing subtle but new forms of urban spatial structure. The regrouping, realignment and redefinition of boundaries manifest in socio-spatial restructuring of urban space. Cities in Nigeria are often characterised by violence and incivility and most urban residents are increasingly concerned about the safety of lives and property. This concern has continuously given rise to the emergence of private initiatives in the prevention and the control of crime and incivility. The private initiatives arose as

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consequences of the failure of the state and her security apparatus to protect life and property of its citizens especially in most developing countries. Urban residents redefine urban space to mosaic of privately controlled territories with differently installed security strategies. The form of privatised and informal crime and social control mechanisms in most Nigerian cities include neighbourhood enclosures, neighbourhood patrol, vigilantes, private security or corporate guards, street surveillance, mob action and 'jungle justice'. Sometimes crime suspects had been killed or molested before police arrived. (Agbola 1997, Fabiyi 2004.)

Urban residents in Ibadan like other major urban centres in Nigeria are continuously regrouping in the residential neighbourhoods to fill the gaps of the security voids created by the inefficiency of the conventional police system particularly in the residential precincts.

The involvement of non-state actors in the provision of security was initially limited to the private companies, commercial centres and industrial areas in Nigeria. However when the levels of insecurity increased generally in the mid seventies in Nigeria, the informal non-state actors emerged to provide private alternatives to security services in the neighbourhoods.

In order to pay for privately procured security alternatives, urban residents regroup and align themselves based on certain segregation factors which can be physical, social or economic to jointly contribute for purchasing security 'goods'. This form of regrouping and realignments constitute another forms of sub-local administration in urban setting, while in some instances it has developed to a full urban sub culture within the city. The fear of crime, and the general belief that crime-target is spatially and socially selective often serve as impetus for the realignment and repartitioning of urban neighbourhoods to manageable territories for sub-local governance. (Fabiyi 2006). These regroupings and realignments are assigned different nomenclatures such as neighbourhood associations, resident associations and other local appellations or street names. However, within the context of this paper, all these groupings will be referred to as Neighbourhood Associations (NAs). The physical manifestations of these regrouping may sometimes be in form of barrier and enclosures, or political demarcation, which are used to define members and outsiders. Though conventional urban culture encourage individualism and anonymity (Zorbaugh 1929; Gan 1962; Wilson 1987; Williamson 2003), the concern for safety of lives and property served as centripetal force and the basis for regrouping and thus building community spirit in urban residential neighbourhoods.

This paper attempts to examine the nature and types of social regrouping and networks in Urban neighbourhood especially as it relates to security of lives and properties in Ibadan city using neighbourhood associations(NAs) as platform. The paper therefore addresses the following questions:

- What are the nature and types of emerging non state initiatives of crime control in Ibadan urban residential neighbourhoods?
- What are the implications of these initiatives on space use, space ownerships and space management in urban areas?
- How do urban residents organise themselves to achieve collective efficacy instil social norms and primary affiliation in residential neighbourhoods?

### **The Study Area**

Ibadan is located in the South-western part of Nigeria. It lies within latitude 7° 19' 08" and 7° 29' 25" of the equator and longitude 3° 47' 50" and 4° 0' 22. It is the capital of Oyo State. The inner ring which is often referred to as Ibadan metropolis comprises of five local government areas, while the outer ring comprises of six local governments. Ibadan is an indigenous urban settlement but is fast becoming heterogeneous multi-ethnic urban centre.

### **Methodology**

Data collection methods used for this study include structured interview and participant observations. The neighbourhoods associations in Ibadan were sought, through a purposive sampling and their executive were targeted for interview. The questions asked include how, when and why the associations were established, and the functions performed by the associations as relate to security and crime control. The nature of security arrangement put in place in the neighbourhood by the associations, the relationship between the association and the police and other security agents in the cities. The norms and primary affiliation developed through time in the neighbourhoods, crime control strategies among others.

It was observed that some neighbourhood associations (NAs) in the study area were dormant, inactive or apparently extinct. Some were not forthcoming in releasing information about their activities while some gave inconsistent information; therefore such responses were jettisoned in the course of the analysis. Some resident associations encountered in the course of the study mis-interpreted the objectives of the research, therefore giving obvious false information. This group of information was equally dropped during the analysis. In the final analysis a total of 209 neighbourhoods associations' responses were used in the analyses. The information obtained was corroborated through participant observation where possible. During the interview 37.8% of the interviews were conducted with the neighbourhood associations (NAs) chairmen in attendance, while about 6.7% had other members of the association executive in attendance. More than 54.5 percent had the chairmen and other members of the association in attendance during the interview. Only in

two neighbourhoods did secretaries represent the association in the interview (See table 1. )

**Table 1: Position of Respondent in NA**

Respondent position in NA	Frequency	Percent
Chairman	79	37.8
Secretary	2	1.0
Other members	14	6.7
Chairman and others	114	54.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>209</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Authors field work

## **EMERGENCE OF NEIGHBOURHOOD ASSOCIATIONS IN NIGERIA AND URBAN RESIDENTIAL SPACE MANAGEMENT**

Nigeria has a long history of urban culture (Talbot 1924, Mabogunje 1968, Dmochowski 1990) with cities like Kano, Ibadan and Oyo having over one hundred thousand people crowded in the city space even before the advent of the Europeans. The nature of urban governance in the cities under the traditional rulers like the Obas, Obis and Emirs provided for quarters and neighbourhood administrators such as the Chiefs, Akimis, Baales, and Bales, (Mabogunje 1968, Olaniyi 2005 ,Fabiya 2005) At the introduction of colonial rule in the 18<sup>th</sup> century and the installation of democratic systems during independence, the quarter chiefs, Bale and Baale, Akimis and Ezes were made irrelevant in the new urban administrative dispensations. (Their activities are limited to rural areas)They were replaced by the local government councils and their chairmen and councillors. Unfortunately, however, the conventional governance at the local level has been virtually absent or ineffective in most Nigerian cities. The official neighbourhood association was first noticed in Nigeria in the fifties in Lagos as landlord associations. The Landlord association which is a collection of home owners in a neighbourhood who had the sole objectives of improving the welfare of members and development of their communities, emerged in the 1950s when native urban residents club together to present their needs and grievances to the colonial provincial heads. The activities of these associations came into the lime light during the Lagos Slum clearance project in 1952 (Mabogunje 1968). The residents joined forces together in order to present their grievances to the board in charge of resettlement. Since then Neighbourhoods associations have been a popular phenomenon in many Nigerian cities. Shortly after independence however, urban Neighbourhoods Associations started to get involved in developing strategies to combat crime as well as meet other neighbourhood challenges in the seventies. Community associations in the rural areas are quite different in structure, norms and focus from their urban counterparts. The NAs in Ibadan city started as groups of individuals who are house owners in a particular neighbourhood clubbing together to attend to the

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welfare of their neighbourhoods in the last thirty years. Most of the association are recent dating back to the last ten years.

In Ibadan city, a large percentage (41.5%) were established between ten and twenty years ago while another 10.6% could not state the time the association were formed. Most of these NA executives in this categories are new arrivals in the neighbourhoods.

The landlord association has grown with time to comprise both the house owners and the tenants. Security appears to be the major issue of as shown in Table 2 consideration in most of these neighbourhood associations. About 80.3 % of the association peddled insecurity as major reason to convince members to join as well as major issues discussed at meetings. Thirty six associations (13.6%) claimed the need for physical development in the neighbourhoods was major in bringing them together, while a fraction (11.1%) developed through the need to cater for the welfare of members in the neighbourhood. It is noteworthy that in most of these neighbourhoods where security is the main concern there are some level of social cohesion and primary affiliation among residents. The sale of crime fear or crime threat is the primary currency used to secure participation from members and to enforce legitimacy by the executives. Though there is freedom of association in Nigeria, the fear of crime and criminality have been used to coerce, encourage and intimidate urban residents into belonging to the neighbourhood associations in the neighbourhoods in Ibadan city. It is obvious that the neighbourhood associations though may experience up and down times in most neighbourhoods they are quick to resurface when there are crime reports or rumours in the near neighbourhoods or in the city.

**Table 2: Primary reason for grouping in neighbourhood**

Reason for forming association	Frequency	Percentage
Security	168	80.3
Development	29	13.6
Welfare	11	6.1
Total	209	100

Source: Authors field survey 2005

The administrative structure put in place by the neighbourhood associations is diverse but far from being democratic, 63.2 percent appoint their leaders while a fraction 25.1 percent use election process to select the association leadership. In the remaining neighbourhoods the first landlord or the oldest in the neighbourhood retain the chairmanships and appoint committee members to work with him. The committee members retain the position until they decide to relinquish the positions. Generally change in leaderships in most of the associations is crisis free. The sub local level neighbourhood leaders are usually strong and powerful and wield strong

influence in the neighbourhoods especially in the poor and lower middle class neighbourhoods. There are however records of breakaway and readjustment of administrative boundaries. The boundaries of an NA administration range from small to big, in fact some administer only two streets.

**Table3: Number of houses in Neighbourhood Association**

No of houses in NA	Frequency	Percentage
Below 10	5	2.4
11-20	44	21.1
21-30	89	42.6
31-40	31	14.8
Above 40	40	19.1

Source: Authors field survey 2005

Many of the associations administer between 21-30 buildings (42.6%) while only few (2.4%) administer small neighbourhoods below ten houses. (see table 3). The boundaries of the associations can be very fussy and they continually readjust the boundaries to include the interested residents and the perceived indifferent residents but exclude the potential objectors. It was observed that disagreement over issues like subscriptions and project implementations mostly lead to fragmentations of residential neighbourhoods in Ibadan city. The boundaries of the associations are markedly obvious in the enclosed neighbourhoods where road closures in form of gates and barriers are both used as security device and as juridical demarcations, but in non gated neighbourhoods the boundaries are not visible but members know the boundaries.

The neighbourhood associations controlled the residential space mostly at night through the installation of security apparatus such as street gates. More than 35% of the association erects street gates while over 60.8% use other forms of self protection, apart from installation of street gates. Though majority did not erect street gates, access to most residential areas are restricted at night. There is often a mini-curfew in most neighbourhoods which range between 11 pm and 5 am. Visitors are challenged and in some cases they are turned back from the neighbourhoods.

**Table 4: Residential access restriction through gate**

Gate on street	Frequency	Percent
No gate	127	60.8
One gate	74	35.4
Two gates	8	3.8
Total	209	100.0

Source: Authors field survey 2005



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Urban residential space control is the sole responsibility of the local governments, crime fear and past experience of crime were responsible for the hijack of urban space by the private actors (NAs executives) who enforce norms in the residential areas such as those allowed in the neighbourhoods. In some neighbourhoods visited commercial motor cycle are prohibited from the neighbourhoods, while in some hawkers are forbidden from entering the neighbourhood. In some high income residential neighbourhoods commercial taxis and buses are prohibited. The road space though owned and maintained by the state for public use has been hijacked by the collective few under the guise of neighbourhood association. Most of the associations involved in access restrictions claimed they experienced violent crime before restriction (52.2%) while (47.8%) claimed they restrict access because of experience in near neighbourhoods.

### **PLURALITY OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN URBAN NEIGHBOURHOODS**

The nature and types of security arrangement in residential neighbourhoods in Ibadan are closely associated with the densities and economic status of residents in the neighbourhoods and the level of crime threat (real or perceived). It was observed that different security arrangements were employed by residents in Ibadan residential neighbourhoods, there is no neighbourhood that did not adopt at least one security strategy.

The security arrangements in the neighbourhoods are designed to engage criminals rather than being informant to the police; however crime watch is dominant at night and include five major types of security arrangements as follows:

- (a) **Night guards or watchmen**; most residential neighbourhoods in Ibadan have night watchmen who are usually recruited from outside the neighbourhoods. The popular patronage are the non natives such as Hausas and Fulani. However a number of them employ OPC<sup>1</sup> members.
- (b) **Road closures**: road closures appear to be the cheapest form of security arrangement in Ibadan region. Gates or crossbars are erected on access road into the neighbourhoods, and are locked at 11pm or 12 midnight and open at 5 am or 6 am. In most of the neighbourhood that adopt road closures approach, the barrier or road closures are not manned at night. The neighbourhood curator locks gate at night and open in the morning. The neighbourhood may have night watchmen or not. Most of these gates are constructed to restrict vehicular access. It was observed during the study that, about 24.5% of road closures neighbourhoods are in the high density areas, 63.8% in the medium density areas while 11.7% are in the low density areas. Road closures are common in all the neighbourhoods visited during the study.

- (c) **Whistles and alarm systems:** In some neighbourhoods alarm systems are given to members to ward-off criminals. If a member is attacked in the neighbourhood other members blow whistle or operate the alarm systems to confuse the intruders and thus chase them away. About 23.4% adopts this instruments alongside with others security strategies, most of them (45.3%) are found in the rich neighbourhoods.
- (d) **Police patrol:** though very insignificant and mostly unsustainable, some neighbourhood adopt police patrol by providing fuel and other logistics to the police in order to patrol their neighbourhood at night. The services are at best epileptic or fizzles out as the crime threat subsides. About 1.2% of the neighbourhood adopts police patrol in Ibadan city.
- (e) **Vigilante:** Vigilante is restricted to the core and poor neighbourhoods in Ibadan around Oje, Oranmiyan and Labo. It involved the young men in the neighbourhood taking turn to keep watch over the neighbourhood. They go about with club, cutlasses and Dane guns. They are often ill equipped to match the sophisticated weapons of criminals. About 3.1% of the neighbourhoods utilised the vigilante system for neighbourhood protections.
- (f) **Charm and amulet:** Charms and amulets are common among the middle class and poor neighbourhoods. Some of these neighbourhoods utilised the use of traditional charms and amulets to keep watch over the neighbourhoods. The individual who possess or claim to possess such prowess are often appointed as chairman (since most of these associations have their major emphasis on security as highlighted earlier) or leader of the security team. Only two neighbourhoods indicated this method during the field survey.

These security arrangements in the residential neighbourhoods have cost implications which sourced through levies and subscription of members. The average household in Ibadan through the NAs in the poor and lower middle class neighbourhoods spend between 1,500 naira and 3,000 naira per annum as security dues to the associations and as much as 5,000 and 25,000 naira in the upper middle and upper class area for neighbourhood security. The dues and subscription are symbols of loyalty and sources of developing community spirit in the neighbourhood. The residents demand service from the executives who are accountable to the residents. Though most leadership emerged through undemocratic means yet they enjoy allegiance and loyalty from the members.

## **SOCIO-SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF URBAN RESIDENTS IN IBADAN NEIGHBOURHOODS AND INSECURITY INDUCED SPATIAL ADJUSTMENTS.**

Agglomeration and segregation refer to a process of clustering wherein individuals and groups shifted and sorted out in space based on their sharing certain traits or activities in common or equal status. (Van der Zandern 1996; Adeboye 2003; Fabiyi 2006,) As towns grow to mega-cities with attendant high social inequalities, people of similar social and economic status intuitively are sorted out in urban space by the forces of demand and supply and government land use policies (Gans 1962; Aldrich *et al* 1989; Fabiyi 2004,). Ibadan metropolis is characterised by different forms of segregation and alignment factors which can be broadly described as follows:

### **Ethno-cultural enclaves**

The segregation or grouping can be based on ethnicity; wherein members of the same ethnic group, finding themselves in a foreign land, choose to live in close proximity to one another, this arrangement is also called 'ethnic enclaves' (Boracich and Model 1980, Aldrich *et al* 1989, Adeboye 2003). Sabo, Ojoo, Oke ado, some parts of Mokola, Ekotèdo-Iyaolobe are some examples of ethnic enclaves in Ibadan. Some of these residents belong to second or third generation of migrants. There are some neighbourhoods that are dominated by particular nationals such as migrants from Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Benin republic, Cameroon among others. Some of these international immigrants have ownership status of properties.

### **Land use and housing policy factor**

Land use policies of government are another major factor sorting out people in space. Such policies such as land use scheme or Master plan when land is allocated on the basis of income or race through government policy, it can encourage segregation and corresponding social exclusion to non members of the neighbourhoods. Private and public organisations do have housing schemes or development where people of different occupational and professional status are grouped together in different parts of the urban areas. There may be junior staff estate, senior staff estate or managerial staff estate. This procedure can also be found in government or institutional housing programmes such as barracks, Universities and other public agencies. The concentration of residents of a particular social, occupational or professional class in certain precincts in the city often serves as pivot for social and spatial exclusion of outsiders and foundation for primary affiliation.

### **Socio-temporal class agglomeration**

Due to city expansion different parts of the city develop at different times. The residential mobility is associated with the income mobility of urban residents. When people of equal economic class migrate to a part of the city based on the facility available and the ability to pay for the service. With time age and reduction in economic capacity as the economically active households retires and the children move out of the neighbourhoods, the area becomes residential enclaves of retirees and old people. There is generation-shift of residential neighbourhoods as land price determines the economic status of people that are attracted to particular neighbourhoods. There can also be succession of residential neighbourhoods when a given social class is partly or completely replaced by another social class who are stronger economically and buys over the properties thus displacing the existing class who have hitherto moved down economic ladder. Examples of these can be found in Old Bodija, Agodi GRA, Iyaganku GRA and Oluyole Estate. Most residents in these areas are old retirees and sometimes new arrivals who bought over property.

### **Mixed neighbourhood agglomeration**

Apart from the agglomeration factors identified above there are a number of mixed neighbourhoods socially and development wise. With only few exceptions in Ibadan, poor neighbourhoods often intermix with good neighbourhoods or lie side by side. People of different social, economic, ethnic, educational and occupational status live together in the same or adjacent neighbourhoods. Majority of the residential neighbourhoods in Ibadan metropolis fall within this categories of agglomeration. Though these segregation forces are well understood (Fabiya 2005) a new force of alignment is emerging, where people regroup and redefine residential boundary based on common fear of insecurity.

### **A new force of realignment and segregation**

The fear of crime (real or perceived) is increasingly regrouping people socially, spatially and administratively in Ibadan neighbourhoods. Residents of the same level of fear or perception of danger in residential neighbourhoods are likely to form a common front to fight perceived danger and enforce social control within the sub group Fabiya (2004.) When people of the same social group club together to provide security apparatus, it is often designed exclusively for members of the group and inevitably creates condition of segregation and redefinition of boundaries within the neighbourhood subsystem with separate policies and administration. In Ibadan neighbourhoods there is continuous fragmentation of physical and social space to create jurisdiction for NAs administrations where series of control and security strategies are put in place.

### **Resulting social and juridical fragmentation and administration**

The basis for the administrative partitioning of the neighbourhoods include the nature of street network, presence of residents of like minds and the experience of crime or crime threat, social-class similarity and the presence of objectors. These are the major factors involved in delimiting NAs administrative boundaries. Though Ibadan residential neighbourhoods' administrations are continuously fragmented into smaller neighbourhoods, there was no case where such fragmentation was based on ethnicity or nationality. However some neighbourhoods are homogeneous in nationality or ethnicity context.

It was observed that 78.9% of the associations interviewed are product or association break up, while 35.2% have experienced break up in the last 2 years. The break-ups often results in further fragmentations of the neighbourhoods into mosaic of administrative territory by the NAs. The fragmentation can also be based on the discretion of the executives who can carve out a portion of the neighbourhoods for easy administration. This occurs where the street networks make the security arrangement put in place ineffective. In some cases, the road network patterns clearly dictate the boundaries of NA (27.2%). Some NAs stated that the territorial boundaries are demarcated based on convenience for administration (32.4%) and easy monitoring for the security personnel since most of the associations were formed for security reasons. Three models of association boundaries were observed in Ibadan city and presented as follows:

- (i) ***Single street or cul-de sac associations.*** :Single street or cul de sac association are ubiquitous in Ibadan. They are mostly informal and mostly do not change leadership frequently. A group of residents in a single street or a close may decide to close off the street in order to prevent crime or hire street watch to patrol the street at night.
- (ii) ***Quarter/compound Neighbourhood association:*** Quarter/compound Neighbourhood associations are common in the Core regions and high density neighbourhoods. Such as Oje, Beere, Oranmiyan, Beiyeruka and Isale osi. The indigenous quarters in Ibadan are mostly patrilinear which later translated to neighbourhood associations. The oldest landlord in the neighbourhood retain the chairman position until he wish to relinquish it through old age or ill health. These neighbourhoods still retain the friend and neighbourhood spirit in the residential precinct. primary affiliation is very effective in these neighbourhoods, communal norms are easily enforced which are passed down through generations. Though these are mostly poor neighbourhoods, they believe criminals come from outside the neighbourhood. They also prevent the development of criminal networks in the neighbourhoods. The residents live predominantly communal lifestyle

(iii) ***Multiple-street neighbourhood association:*** When neighbourhood are socially and economically homogenous, it is possible to develop collective responsibility. The multiple street neighbourhood associations are usually large and are more democratic than other two types earlier discussed, these neighbourhoods often accommodate the enlightened group and do not adopt norms or restrictions that is common in the two models earlier discussed

The NAs in Ibadan neighbourhoods are emerging as strong sub-local power bases and mimics conventional government in their activities and administrative structure. The residents are forced to adopt certain behavioural pattern such as retiring home early, being ones brother's keepers, which are effective in preventing the incursion of crime from outside, and also discourage the development of criminal networks within neighbourhoods.

Community spirit and collective action are major in ensuring safer neighbourhoods especially where the state instrument is either absent or ineffective. The community spirit and primary affiliations are more frequent within small neighbourhoods association boundary and when they are demarcated by road closures. Privatisation of security apparatus in urban neighbourhoods inevitably erodes social anonymity and encourages social cohesion among urban residents. The theory of social anonymity in the city is punctuated by the non-state strategies for crime control by the NAs in Ibadan. The neighbourhoods operate as village setting where everyone knows each other in the neighbourhoods and can impose sanctions on members as shown in the following responses:

### **Legislative environment**

Privatisation of public space and security presents conflict between right to access by all and right to protect by few. It is unlikely that the neighbourhood associations can perform the role of crime and social control without infringing on the right of others without or make some costly mistakes. On the other hands if urban residential area have unrestricted access, in the absence of effective policing, it is difficult to ensure safety of life and properties. These two extremes could only be resolved through appropriate legislation based on aspiration of the general populace. In Oyo state (the state where Ibadan is located ) there is Mobilisation of community development committees Edict of Oyo state 1987, which provides for the formation of neighbourhood association and setting up of community development committee charged with the responsibilities of keeping watch over the community and collect information in respect of persons with criminal tendencies and pass such information to the police for purposes of detection of crime within their communities. The edit however was ill structured and devolved power of neighborhood security to the vigilante group without prescribing the agency to monitor, control or regulate the activities of these neighborhood associations.

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The neighbourhood association seems to have different criminal code from what is available in the national criminal code. For instance a number of crimes are often over looked in the neighbourhoods even if the NAs are aware of these such as domestic violence, Forgery, drunken driving, incest, while some actions that are not criminals in the national criminal code are often labelled as crime in some neighbourhoods such as commercial motorcyclist entrance into the neighbourhoods, hawking, and late night or drunken stranger.

The NAs also construct different images for labeling criminals or potential ones. Such images include dressing, appearance, outlook and the period of entry into the neighbourhood. These labels apparently show a thin line between innocent stranger and criminals especially for untrained mind. This approach to identifying suspected criminal has the potential of criminalizing poverty, casual dressing or late night hang on. Training can be provided by the state authority for all members of the private security personnel, vigilantes and other stakeholders on the rudiments of crime control and managements.

### **PRIVATE INITIATIVES IN SECURITY SERVICES AND IMPLICATION ON SUB-LOCAL LEVEL GOVERNANCE**

From the foregoing, private initiatives are increasingly encroaching on what is previously classified as the exclusive function of the state. The incursion of the non state actors in the supply of primary public goods such as security has several implications on urban governance and city livability. Webster (2005) clearly differentiates public goods from privately provided goods. Security of lives and properties is an example of commonly consumed public goods but are both privately and publicly supplied. Publicly consumed goods may not necessarily be supplied adequately by the state due to inadequate resources, on one hand but can also not be effectively supplied by entrepreneur as profit motives will inevitably leads to exclusion and infringements of rights of non complaints. (Foldvary 1994). Without state intervention, the economic interest of private actors will make security to be undersupplied or not supplied at all. Security presence on one street inevitably provide a sense of safety to residents on either flanges of the road, it becomes difficult to exclude non paying member of the street from security services. Unless the fee paying subscribers are prepared to internalise the cost of providing security to the non fee paying members, it will be difficult to achieve evenness and balance in the supply of security goods. Other side of the coin is that the profit motives of the non-state providers will encourage exclusion of the non-contributors resulting into different forms of social segregation and socio-spatial readjustment of people in space with it attendant problems of alienation and conflicts.

Security of life and properties is one of the state duties and public goods that are jointly consumed by the urban populace but are not uniformly provided in

urban space, neither are they uniformly demanded. Unfortunately the most critical area in the city are often less policed. When the state failed to adequately supply this goods or the supply is not evenly distributed; it gives room for the participation of profit making entrepreneur who intend to maximise profit through the interplay of the demand and supply. Crime fear becomes the currency and the advertisement gimmick used by the private entrepreneur to sell security services. The private actors in the case of Ibadan are the neighbourhood associations executives who often sell crime fear, through rumour and crime experience in other areas to convince neighbourhood residents to participate in NAs activities.

The best approach in resolving the paradox of the publicly consumed goods that are not effectively or adequately supplied by the state is the intervention of an agency that has the outlook of state in supply of public goods but wear the garb of *entrepreneur* in the distribution and consumption of public goods. We argue in this paper that the Neighbourhood associations adequately fill this void. The collective efforts and programmes put in place in the neighbourhoods operate as pseudo- state in supply of security goods and internalising the cost of *indifferents* and *objectors* yet they act as profit minded entrepreneur in the demand for service and distribution of security goods in the neighbourhood..

Urban areas have a number of jointly consumed goods such as infrastructure, services, space, air and culture. (Webster 2005). That is why they need to be carefully managed. Few urban public goods are truly ubiquitous, most are exhaustible and can degenerate or depreciate if not properly maintained. They are also not consumed equally by all citizens. The amount of public goods available to an individual or group depends largely on the physical and social distances to these public goods. Most urban public goods are consumed not by *the public* but by *specific publics* –often defined by location and social context. If streets are not managed by the residents it becomes the haven of street kids or criminals, the consequence on the residents along the street is far grater than effects on other members of the society. Therefore the street in the neighbourhood though a public goods is not equally consumed by all members of the publics. Private management will ensure that the street or neighbourhood environments do not degenerate or depreciate socially and in economic value.

Hardin 1968, and Webster 2005 had observed the tragedy of common resources in the popular concepts termed “tragedy of the commons”. They postulated that Individual grazers pursuing their own interest will eventually destroy the common resource, since the benefit gained from grazing an extra cow is captured in full but the cost of doing so is shared with all other grazers. Urban ‘commons’ (streets, parks, rivers and so on) in most cities are subject to the same calculus and inevitably degrade as a result. The right to use a street also implies a cost that is shared by others. Many people use common facilities for small personal gains



and impose costs that are unrelated to the size of those gains. Though streets are public goods and should be open to all road users, however the public access to neighbourhoods has negative effects on the residents. The benefits derived by public trying to use neighbourhood access to link other major roads are not commensurate to the social and economic cost on the residents. The infringements on the privacy of the residents in a neighbourhood cannot be compared with the benefits accruable to the commuters who want to use the roads to connect other main roads. The demand for efficient security services for both lives and properties call for input from private agents.

Demand for these shared public goods reduces with distance from them. Security goods are not equally required by the public, the demand relates to social and geographic location. Police presence which stands as public supply are also geographically limited based on the present level of technology and expertise in Nigeria. The security risks of the rich are higher than that of the poor. The risk increases when the rich neighbourhood lies side by side with poor neighbourhoods as the case is in many neighbourhoods in Ibadan. There are pockets of poor neighbourhoods adjacent or within good neighbourhoods. The security goods demanded by the rich will inevitably be higher than the poor areas. While the goal of public goods supply in Nigerian state is *evenness* or uniform distribution, therefore it becomes necessary that the shortfall be paid for by the rich.

Olson 1965 in his logic *theory of collective action*, stated that the larger the group the less likely it is to be organised successfully. This is because despite the obvious benefit accruing from collective action; a rational man will prefer to be a free rider. The proposition of this theory suggests that If NAs operate mainly on the voluntary membership; it is likely to be less efficient and ineffective, as average residents would rather not participate in resident association. This proposition is further reinforced by the nature of anonymity and casual relationships that exist in typical urban centres. Though empirical and anecdotal evidences suggest that the participation rate in all NAs is generally low, (Barton and Silverman 1987), yet NAs continue to grow in numbers in residential areas of major urban settlements of the world. In Ibadan though some of these associations are ailing, they often resurrect spontaneously when there threat is perceived.

The fear and experiences of crime in urban areas result in social regrouping and redefinitions of boundaries of *good* and *bad* regions, *dangerous* and *friendly* neighbours, *social* and *antisocial*, *good* norms and *bad* norms, and signs and images of potential danger. However collective efforts to fight crime necessarily need to clearly or intuitively define these boundaries in a manner acceptable to members to achieve collective participation in crime fighting and crime prevention. The process of defining boundaries and social regrouping usually result into formal association in different apparel, forms and nomenclatures. The genesis of

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Neighbourhood associations (NAs) in most neighbourhoods is far from being systematic; it is either subtle or sometimes spontaneous. Neighbourhood associations (NA) are largely voluntary, and yet require financial subscription from members. The associations secure legitimacy through persuasions and house to house campaigns, but as soon as they secure the mandate of the people, they enforce collective norms on individual members of the neighbourhoods and the new arrivals. The norms are usually not debated by the general house but the representatives and NAs executives act as custodian of neighbourhood norms and behavioural pattern especially those that relate to insecurity and neighbourhood protection.

People participate in collective actions if they have grievances and there is potential threat. (Oropesa 1992, Venkatesh 2000, Olsen et al., 1989). The NAs executives have to continuously amplify crime threat to maintain loyalty and commitment from the members. Though majority of the neighborhoods have not experienced violent crime in the last one year, yet press reports and rumours of crime are presented to the residents to sustain the associations and payment of security fees. In a nutshell, it was observed that fear of danger (real or perceived) is a strong cohesive force in the Ibadan residential neighborhoods .

## **CONCLUSION**

In the final analysis, the willingness of NAs to intervene for common good depends in large part on condition of mutual trust and solidarity among members. The installation of security arrangement in urban neighbourhoods by the NAs, has brought a new dimension to social structure, relationships and liveability of the city in Ibadan but also imposes some norms and convention. It introduces behavioural patterns that enhance and strengthen social cohesion, good behaviour and responsible citizenships in Ibadan.

In Ibadan residential neighbourhoods, public authorities are loudly absent and apathetic, revealing the prominence of self-organisation as the dominant mode of urban regulation. The activities of these non-state actors in informal social and crime controls within urban neighbourhoods place a question mark on the legitimacy of the government as the sole producer of security 'goods' and manager of urban public space. It also has the potential of complicating as well as jeopardising future urban governance and civic rights of other urban residents. Without proper regulation and control the aftermath of such informal control is close to chaos which could also undermine the power of the state.

The national budget allocation to the police in the year 2004 translate to an average amount of about 450 naira per head per annum spent by Nigerian government to secure a citizen , about 37 naira per month per head, In 2005 the allocation merely increased to 484 naira per annum per head. However an average

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urban household spend about 6000 naira per annum for neighbourhood protection. There is need to increase funding of urban policing system or strengthen community policing system for urban residential areas.

Under the condition of liberal law or no law at all, the residents are quick to develop rules, laws or convention in their neighborhoods, these laws however may be a pointer to knowing how a set of people want to live together in a neighborhood. NAs in Ibadan have proved to be formidable sources of collective efficacy and pivot for developing community spirit. NAs administration has the potential of redistributing urban residents into their pure structure which can enhance urban managements.

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